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AN URBAN SLICE OF APPLE PIE:
RETHINKING HOMEOWNERSHIP IN U.S. CITIES
GEORGETTE CHAPMAN PHILLIPS*
"For some families some houses represent wise buys, but a culture
and real estate industry that give blanket endorsement to owner-
ship fail to indicate which families and which houses."
-John P. Dean (1945)'
The romantic notion of homeownership is deeply rooted in the
American psyche. Homeownership as the "American Dream" borders on
clich6. We proclaim that June is "National Home Ownership Month."2
However, it is worth asking whether this aspiration to own a home can or
should be spatially differentiated. Beginning with the first Home Own-
ers' Loan Corporation (HOLC) maps that infamously redlined inner-city
neighborhoods, the push toward homeownership favored suburban loca-
tions.3 As GIs returned from World War II, suburban Levittown-type
developments beckoned with the promise of a safe and tranquil escape
from the tensions of the city. Homeownership rates in the suburbs typi-
cally far outstripped homeownership rates in the metropolitan cities of
the United States.4 Other government policies built upon this suburban
favoritism leaving city dwellers to wonder if they were, in fact, permitted
to share in the same dream.
* Georgette Chapman Phillips is the David B. Ford Professor of Real Estate at the
Wharton School and Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Financial support supplied by the Zell Lurie Real Estate Center. Research Assistance pro-
vided by Jennifer Panichelli Barzeski and Rami Reyes. Thanks also to participants in the
Wharton Real Estate Department Seminar Series for all of their insightful comments, to
Amy Hillier for her mapping expertise, and to government housing authority profession-
als who took the time to educate me about their projects.
1. JOHN P. DEAN, HOMEOWNERSHIP: IS IT SOUND? (1945) (quoted in Lawrence
Vale, The Ideological Origins of Affordable Home Ownership, in CHASING THE AMERICAN
DREAM: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP 37 (William M. Rohe
& Harry L. Watson eds., 2007)).
2. A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership
Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 190 (2009).
3. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
4. In 1950, the city owner occupied percentage was 50% and the suburban owner-
occupied percentage was 56%. 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS OF HOUSING: 1950, PT. 1, AT 2 TBL. 2 (1953) [hereinafter 1950 CENSUS OF
HOUSING]. By 1960, the city owner-occupied percentage was 47%, and the suburban
owner occupied was 67%. 4 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CEN-
SUS OF HOUSING: 1960, pt. lB, at 23 tbl. 1 (1962) [hereinafter 1960 CENSUS OF
HOUSING].
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Urban economists, sociologists and policy makers, however, extolled
both the individual benefits of homeownership (wealth creation, forced
savings) and the positive externalities (stability, crime reduction, etc.),
and pushed for an increase in homeownership rates in urban neighbor-
hoods. 5 Citing the long history of racial discrimination in mortgage lend-
ing, advocates of homeownership pushed for regulation barring this type
of discrimination and opening the mortgage markets to previously
underserved populations. In the most recent past, the Community Rein-
vestment Act of 1977 (CRA) and policy changes at the mortgage giants
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had the explicit goal of increasing home-
ownership in historically underserved city neighborhoods. 6
City homeownership did have a substantial increase in the 2000
census when the rate of urban homeownership hit 53.4%.7 However, the
soft underbelly of this increase was the creeping reliance on subprime
loans to finance this ownership. Even before the current crisis, there was
a heavier use of non-prime loans in minority and inner-city neighbor-
hoods.8 The advent of the subprime adjustable rate mortgage (ARM)
may have contributed to a noted increase in urban homeownership.
However, as that bubble began to burst, not only did the dreams of the
individual homeowners evaporate into foreclosure, the visions of city
leaders built upon the same dreams morphed into fiscal nightmares.
That leaves us with the salient question: Does (or should) the dis-
tinctly suburban mindset of homeownership have a place in urban pol-
icy? The fact that many households hold their wealth through
homeownership does not mean that this should be true of all. 9 Indeed, to
answer the question we must first historically contextualize patterns of
urban housing tenure and contrast it with the growing push toward sub-
urban homeownership. The next step will entail discussing the recent
federal policy initiatives directed specifically at urban homeownership
and their effect on housing tenure. The recent boom and bust of the
residential housing market had grave implications for urban communities
5. See Joseph M. Harkness and Sandra J. Newman, Effects of Homeownership on
Children: The Role of Neighborhood Characteristics and Family Income, FED. REs. BANK N.
Y. ECON. POL'Y REV., June 2003, at 87; Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond
a Subprime Crisis: The Role of Delinquency Management, 76 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2261,
2261-62 (2008).
6. Pub. L. No. 95-218, tit. VIII (Community Reinvestment), §§ 801-806, 91
Stat. ll11, 1147-48 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2000)).
7. U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, AMERICAN
HousING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2007, 12 tbl. 1B-1 (2007), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/h150-07.pdf.
8. U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEV., SUBPRIME LENDING REPORT, UNEQUAL
BURDEN: INCOME & RACIAL DIsPARmITEs IN SUBPRIME LENDING (2000).
9. See Jacoby, supra note 5, at 2278. But see J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond,
Affordable Housing Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FoRDHM
URB. L.J. 527, 544 (2007) (advocating for homeownership for low-income families).
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due, in large part, to the intersection of racial concentration in residential
living patterns coupled with extraordinary penetration of subprime mort-
gages into the minority housing markets. The foreclosure crisis occupies a
focal point of this discussion. The conclusion advocates a rethinking of
urban housing policy to incorporate not just the goal of individual home-
ownership, but also the stability and economic well being of the city's
neighborhoods-including those who are not able to join the ranks of
homeowners.
I. HISTORICAL NOTIONS OF URBAN HOMEOWNERSHIP
From its agrarian roots, the United States has shifted into a nation
that is increasingly urbanized. In the 1920 census the split between rural
and urban residents was almost even." ° The gap began to widen as early
as the 1930s, when the rural population dropped from 48.8% to 43.9%,
and the urban population increased from 51.2% to 56.1%."1 The differ-
ence became even more pronounced in the 1950s with 36% of the popu-
lation living in rural areas and 64% in urban areas.
12
Mass urbanization began with a shift from an agriculturally focused
nation to a more industrially driven nation. As workers streamed into the
city, they swelled the unsanitary and unsafe tenement houses and rental
apartments.' 3 Teeming masses in squalid living conditions stand in stark
contrast to the traditional Jeffersonian ideal of private landownership that
has permeated American culture since the inception of the country.' 4
Thus the seeds of tension of urban living and homeownership were sown.
In point of fact, however, the idealized notion of homeownership
was not prevalent in urban centers of the United States for the first sev-
eral centuries.' 5 The idea of owning a single-family home gained a foot-
10. Fifty-one percent of the total population was urban and 49% was rural. 2
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1920,
ch. 15, at 1302 tbl. 9 (1922).
11. 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF POPULA-
TION: 1930, at 8 tbl. 3 (1931).
12. 1 1950 CENSUS OF HOUSING, supra note 4, pt. 1, at xxv tbl. F.
13. Charles C. Bohl, Affordable Housing Design for Place Making and Community
Building, in CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 1 at 114.
14. See Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal
City, 145 PA. L. REv. 607, 625 (1997) [hereinafter Poindexter, Collective Individualism].
See also Byrne & Diamond, supra note 9. It is interesting to note that this Jeffersonian
ideal tied civic participation to land ownership. Tenants were not permitted to vote in
federal elections until 1860. See William M. Rohe and Leslie S. Stewart, Homeownership
and Neighborhood Stability, 7 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 37, 37 (1996).
15. In fact, homeownership rates dropped from 1890 to 1920. William H. Rohe
& Harry L. Watson, Introduction: Homeownership in American Culture and Public Policy,
in CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 1 at 1, 9; see also Ira Rheingold, Michael
Fitzpatrick & Al Holfield, Jr., From Redlining to Reverse Redlining- A History of Obstacles
for Minority Homeownership in America, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 642, 642 (2001).
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hold during the 1920s, and urban homeownership rose. Homeownership
rates jumped from 45.6% in 1920 to 47.8% in 1930.16 Even then it was
far from a foregone conclusion that a family (even one of financial
means) would choose to buy a home rather than rent. 17 However, the
bottom of the housing market fell out almost completely during the
Great Depression, and ownership rates dipped once more." In an
attempt to shore up the failing real estate industry, the federal govern-
ment intervened into the private mortgage market with the creation of
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). *9 Interestingly, the market
drop cut across economic statuses. Homeownership rates after the
Depression were not markedly different across class lines. In 1940, the
homeownership rates for skilled and unskilled manual workers were not
far below that for professionals (slightly less than 44%).20 Prior to World
War II, it was common for people (especially those in the working class)
to buy their first home in their forties when the eldest children had
entered the work force and could contribute to the family income.2"
After World War II, homeownership rates skyrocketed in the sub-
urbs, often at the expense of the city. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, most Americans did not own their own homes.2 2 By 1960,
about 61.9% of Americans owned their own homes.2 3 But this growth
was uneven. In 1960, 47% of city units were owner-occupied, whereas
67% of suburban units were owner-occupied.24 The suburbs became
cheap and easy. First of all, land was cheaper away from the city core,
which made homeownership more available.25 Furthermore, the federal
income tax code included deductibility of mortgage interest and real
estate taxes, which made owning a suburban bungalow even cheaper.
26
Federal highway dollars built concrete connectors from bedroom to office
16. Vale, supra note 1, at 16.
17. MARGARET GARB, CITY OF AMERICAN DREAMS: A HISTORY OF HOME OWN-
ERSHIP AND HOUSING REFORM IN CHICAGO 1871-1919 119-120 (2005) (discussing
the ambivalence of upper middle-class families in Chicago in choosing to rent or to buy a
home).
18. Rheingold et al., supra note 15, at 642-643.
19. See U.S. Dep't Hous. & Urban Dev., The Federal Housing Authority (FHA),
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/fhahistory.cfm (last visited June 21, 2010).
20. Richard Harris, The Suburban Worker in the History of Labor, 64 INT'L LAB.
AND WORKING CLASS HIST. 8, 8-24 (2003); Rohe & Watson, supra note 15, at 9;
Richard Harris, Working-Class Home Ownership in the American Metropolis, 17 J. URB.
HIST. 46, 50 (1990).
21. Harris, supra note 20, at 49.
22. U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL
CENSUS OF HOUSING: HOMEOWNERSHIP, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/
census/historic/owner.html (last visited June 21, 2010).
23. Id
24. 1960 Census of Housing, supra note 4, pt. IB, at 23 tbl. 1.
25. Harris, supra note 20, at 59.
26. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (2006). See also Byrne & Diamond, supra note 9, at 542.
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that facilitated commuting from the suburbs.2 7 Federal mortgage guaran-
tees through the FHA enticed buyers to the suburbs. The GI Bill (along
with Veterans Affairs-insured mortgages) opened up capital to returning
soldiers who found they could afford a single-family detached house in
the suburbs.
The propaganda extolling the virtues of homeownership dates back
to Herbert Hoover's "Own-Your-Own-Home" campaign when he was
Secretary of Commerce under Presidents Harding and Coolidge.28 How-
ever, in post-War America, the push toward homeownership was
embraced with new fervor. Whether for economic (promoting self suffi-
ciency and wealth building), psychological (promoting positive well-
being) or social (promoting stable neighborhoods and communities) rea-
sons,2 9 almost no one dared to question the seemingly foregone conclu-
sion that all Americans should strive to own their own home.3" This
thread of tying homeownership to "the American Way" continues strong
through today.3 1
Two separate but powerful changes drastically bent the curve in
homeownership growth: the FHA and zoning. In an effort to jump-start
the moribund construction industry, the FHA was created to insure
home mortgages. 32 This alone has no urban/suburban dichotomy.
Where the division arises lies in the geographically prescribed limits in
which these mortgages can secure a home loan. The invidious HOLC
27. See Georgette C. Poindexter, Towards a Legal Framework for Redistribution of
Poverty-Related Expenses, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEM. L. 3, 8 (1995); Byrne &
Diamond, supra note 9, at 564; William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a
Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD' 317, 327 (2004).
28. Vale, supra note 1, at 19. As an ironic aside, when Hoover was President dur-
ing the Great Depression, encampments of homeless Americans were dubbed
"Hoovervilles."
29. Jacoby, supra note 5, at 2262.
30. Notable critics at the time were Carol Aronovici (who complained that renters
were "not given a proper place on the roster of solid citizenry") and John P. Dean. Vale,
supra note 1, at 37 (quoting CAROL ARONOVICI, HOUSING THE MASSES (1939)). In fact,
the Atlantic Monthly chastised another periodical's criticism of homeownership stating,
"criticism of homeownership is almost as reprehensible as an attack upon the Deity or a
denial of the sincerity of mother's love." Id. (quoting C.B. Reeves, Gamble of Homeowner-
ship, ATLANTic MONTHLY, April 1937, at 450, 450).
31. In August 1986, Newsweek magazine announced that, "Homeownership has
finally joined motherhood and apple pie on the list of unassailable American Institu-
tions." Eric Gelman et al., How Tax Reform Affects You, NEWSWEEK, August 25, 1986 at
19. The same exaltations of homeownership can also be heard in Canada, where scholars
have noted that, "Americans have commonly referred to home ownership as the 'Ameri-
can dream,' but it can with equal justice be described as the dream of Canadians." See
Richard Harris, More American Than The United States, 26 J. URB. HIST. 456, 462
(2000). Contrast this with Switzerland, which has the lowest homeownership rate in
Europe (30%) and is the only developed nation to tax imputed rent. See Fischel, supra
note 27, at 334.
32. Rheingold et al., supra note 15, at 644.
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maps that literally redlined massive swaths of urban neighborhoods (thus
preventing lending on houses in these neighborhoods) serve as the sub-
ject of countless books, articles and scholarly treatises.3 3 The story is well-
told, but it bears a distinct reference here because this was a crucial step
in creating a schism in the rates of homeownership between the city and
the suburbs. Requirements for minimum lot sizes and setbacks, plus a
preference for new construction, all combined to push homeowners to
the suburbs. 34 The crowning fact that the maps were explicitly race-based
left its legacy on countless city neighborhoods where access to capital was
nigh impossible. 35
Furthermore, changes in local government law that affirmed the
constitutionality of zoning catapulted the single-family house into
exalted status. The primacy of single-family dwellings had its roots in
previous land use law initiatives-most notably the publication of A
Model Tenement House Law in New York in 1910.36 This model legisla-
tion categorized dwellings into three classes (single-family, two-family,
and multiple-family) with the goal of eventually eliminating multiple-
family dwellings altogether.37 In 1926, the United States Supreme Court
upheld a zoning law whereby the municipality could restrict a landowner
from using the property except in accordance with the zoning code. The
Court held that it is permissible to segregate land uses for the "health,
safety, and welfare" of the populace. 38 Among the reasons the Court
stated to justify the separation was that the proximity of "apartment
houses" to single-family homes ruined the latter.3 9
If one imagines a zoning code as a triangle with the most intensive
land uses on the bottom, the single-family home designation rests at the
pinnacle. In development, a property can be "up-zoned," meaning that,
in most instances, it can legally be used for less-intensive uses than what
the code allows (e.g., you can build a single house in an area zoned for
multi-family houses). However, it cannot be "down-zoned" (e.g., you
cannot build a multi-family structure in an area zoned for single houses)
without a variance, which will be based on a showing of hardship and/or
necessity. As one commentator has noted, there is no theoretical reason
33. See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985).
34. See Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Historical
and Legal Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
617, 625 (1999).
35. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
36. LAWRENCE VEILLER, A MODEL TENEMENT HOUSE LAW (1910). This book,
published in 1910, detailed a model law aimed at improving multi-family housing in
cities across the country. It was based on the Tenement House Law of 1901.
37. Vale, supra note 1, at 18.
38. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
39. Id.; see also Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for
Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 511, 576 (2007).
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that other land uses should be regarded as less important-but they
are. 4 0 Zoning a piece of land as single-family endows it with the value
that all surrounding land will be used comparably, preserving the eco-
nomic value of the land and incentivizing consumption. This works well
for undeveloped land in the suburbs. However, in urban centers already
built up with attached housing and mixed uses, the endowment value is
unattainable.
A by-product of these policies and laws was the increasing economic
and racial stratification in metropolitan areas. The suburbs grew wealth-
ier and whiter. The central core grew poorer and more dominated by
minority populations. Historically, the gap between Black and White
homeownership was narrowing before 1940." However, as an increasing
number of Blacks left the rural South for the urban North, the gap wid-
ened because homeownership rates for residents of central cities remained
low.4 2 There is no dispute that although racial segregation might have
predated federal housing and transportation initiatives, these programs
reinforced mobility barriers that kept minorities out of the suburbs and
put homeownership beyond their grasp.
43
Civil unrest left many of America's cities bursting into rioting
flames in the late 1960s. One response of the federal government was an
attempt to create housing and homeownership opportunities for low-
income families. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 4 also known
as the Fair Housing Act, sought to eliminate housing discrimination and
level the playing field across racial lines in access to housing. It had two
major goals: expand minority housing opportunities, and foster residen-
tial integration.4 5 Its centerpiece program, Section 235, however, rests in
the history books as a failure. Middle-income white families used the
program to purchase new suburban housing, while Black families were
forced into over-priced, old, inner-city homes of questionable structural
integrity. 4 6 Notwithstanding the failure of the Section 235 program,
40. Fischel, supra note 27, at 327.
41. See GEORGE S. MASNICK, HOME OWNERSHIP TRENDS AND RACIAL INEQUAL-
ITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE 20TH CENTURY 9 (2001).
42. See William J. Collins and Robert A. Margo, Race and Home Ownership: A
Century-Long View, 38 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 68, 89 (2001).
43. The racial impact of federal programs is so well-accepted as to constitute a
stylized fact. See JACKSON, supra note 33, at 362; see also Collins & Margo, supra note 42,
at 84-85; Nier supra note 34, at 618; Byrne & Diamond, supra note 9, at 564; John A.
Powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act at 40, 41 IND.
L. REv. 605, 612 (2008); Rheingold et al., supra note 15, at 644-645.
44. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII (Fair Housing), %. 801-819, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006)).
45. Nier, supra note 34, at 617.
46. For an in-depth analysis, see Kevin Fox Gotham, Separate and Unequal: The
Housing Act of 1968 and the Section 235 Program, 15 Soc. F. 13, 13 (2000); see also
Rheingold et al., supra note 15, at 645.
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there were indeed gains made in homeownership rates among people of
color. In 1950, the non-white homeownership rate was 34.9%; by 1960
it had grown to 38.4%; and by 2000 almost half (47.5%) of non-whites
owned their homes.4 7 These statistics should have been analyzed as com-
pared to white ownership rates of 57%, 64.4% and 73% during the same
period.4
8
In the wake of the Fair Housing Act, several government programs
shifted away from homeownership and focused instead on ensuring
affordability in the central city and toward affordability in the rental mar-
ket. Notably, the Voucher Program under Section 8 introduced tenant
portability to low-income rental housing subsidies. 49 The Low Income
Housing Tax Credit, begun in 1987, incentivizes developers to build low-
income housing by subsidizing the cost of capital. 5° Urban homeowners,
though, no longer occupied center stage in the policy arena.
II. MORE RECENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES AFFECTING
URBAN HOMEOWNERSHIP
Despite the turn towards rental housing, seeds of homeowner policy
remained. Recognizing the disparity between suburban and urban home-
ownership rates (and acknowledging that federal policies had a large
hand in creating these disparities), the federal government did embark on
several programs aimed at increasing urban homeownership-specifically
ownership among the low-to-moderate-income (LMI) groups-whose
effect is still felt today.5 1 These housing programs carried the same tune
of previous federal policies, emphasizing homeownership as an asset-
building, socially beneficial, and economically positive goal (bordering
47. 1 1950 CENSUS OF HOUSING, supra note 4, pt. 1, 2 tbl. 3; 1960 CENSUS OF
HOUSING, supra note 4, pt. 1, at xxvii tbl.; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL CEN-
SUS OF HOUSING TABLES HOMEOWNERSHIP BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2000,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/ownershipbyrace.html (last
visited June 21, 2010). See also Robert A. Margo, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL
ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES: A SUMMARY OF RECENT RESEARCH, NBER Reporter, Winter
2005, available at http://www.nber.org/reporter/winter05/margo.html.
48. See MASNICK, supra note 41, at 21; see also Powell, supra note 43, at 608
(reflecting on the positive gains of the civil rights movement in minority
homeownership).
49. See U.S. Dep't Hous. & Urban Dev., Section 8 Assistance for Public Housing
Relocation/Replacement, http:/ /portal. hud. gov /portal/ page/ portal / HUD / programde-
scription/phrr (last visited June 21, 2010).
50. I.R.C § 42 (2006). See also U.S. Dep't Hous. & Urban Dev., Low-Income
Housing Tax Credits, http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/lihtc.html (last visited June
21, 2010).
51. Since previous federal policies had either the explicit or implicit goal of mov-
ing the white middle class to the suburbs, the literature and policy analysis of urban
homeowners is inextricably intertwined with both class (lower income) and race (minor-
ity). To tease out the differences here would not serve the underlying goal of this article,
as the effect of the difference would be minimal.
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on virtue).52 In particular, two recent developments are generally
acknowledged as the major policy initiatives increasing urban homeown-
ership-the CRA, and the changes at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
A. Community Reinvestment Act
Congress enacted the CRA in 1977 as an attempt to increase access
to credit for lower- and moderate-income borrowers, who were limited
by policies, such as redlining, that systematically excluded certain neigh-
borhoods (based on, among other indicia, racial composition) from
access to mortgage capital. 53 It emerged during a time when bank com-
petition was legally limited, and lenders had little incentive to develop
business in low-income neighborhoods. 54 This underinvestment in cer-
tain communities was held out as the cause of the continued depressed
circumstances in these neighborhoods. 55 The premise underlying the pas-
sage of the CRA was that since banks receive certain benefits, such as
low-interest rates, federal charters, and federal deposits from the govern-
ment, banks should reinvest money into lower income communities,
especially communities where they operate. 56 The mission of the CRA is
"intended to encourage depository institutions to help meet the credit
needs of the communities in which they operate, including low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound bank-
ing operations."
' 57
The CRA, however, does not force banks to loan money to lower-
and moderate-income communities or set specific quotas for lending, as
Congress did not want to dictate an individual bank's lending prac-
tices. 58 Instead, banks are periodically evaluated for their ability to meet
the credit needs of the communities in which they operate through an
examination by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptrol-
52. See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 9, at 543.
53. Nier, supra note 34, at 633; Rheingold et al., supra note 15, at 648; see also
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolu-
tion and New Challenges, Address at The Community Affairs Research Conference
(March 30, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bernanke20070330a.htm.
54. Howard Husock, Op-Ed., Housing Goals We Can't Afford, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2008, at A49.
55. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of Predatory
Lending, 29 FORDHAM UR. L.J. 1571, 1571 (2002).
56. Raymond H. Brescia, Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The Financial
Crisis and the Community Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C. L. REv. 618, 631 (2009).
57. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Community Reinvest-
ment Act, Background & Purpose, http://www.ffiec.gov/CRA/history.htm.
58. Brescia, supra note 56, at 631.
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ler of the Currency, or the Office of Thrift Supervision. 9 The govern-
mental institutions that oversee banks give them one of four ratings-
outstanding, satisfactory, needs to improve, or substantial non-compli-
ance.6 ° In 1995, the Clinton Administration made lending in LMI
neighborhoods a requisite for an "outstanding" rating.6 ' However, a fun-
damental issue that would later play a key role in the recent financial
crisis was that banks were not judged on how their loans performed but
rather on the volume of loans originated.6"
Banks are expected to originate loans in areas where they take
deposits. This is determined by where the bank has its main office, a
branch, or deposit-taking ATMs.63 Non-deposit mortgage lenders are not
subject to the CRA, and commercial banks have the choice whether or
not to count affiliates in their CRA examinations.6 4 One of the reasons
that there may be doubt about whether the CRA leads to more mort-
gages for LMI families in urban areas is that so few of the mortgages
issued to these families have been originated by institutions covered by
the CRA. In fact, only 6% of higher-priced mortgage loans in 2005 and
2006 were covered by the CRA.65
One concern with the CRA is that the statute is loosely written;
accordingly, it is difficult for the regulatory agencies to interpret what
constitutes compliance.66 Another issue is that it is very difficult for
courts to overrule regulatory decisions related to the CRA.6 7 Addition-
ally, the CRA has rarely been enforced-less than .06% of bank applica-
tions from 1988 through May 2007 were denied for failing to meet CRA
criteria.6 8 In light of these deficiencies, efforts were made during the
59. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Community Reinvest-
ment Act, http://www.ffiec.gov/CRA/history.htm.
60. 25 C.F.R. § 25.21 (2010).
61. See Hearing on Perspectives and Proposals on the Community Reinvestment Act
Before the H. Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 111th Cong.
(2010) (written statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Chief Executive Officer, Promontory
Financial Group). See also Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., The Performance and
Profitability of CRA-Related Lending (July 17, 2000), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/surveys/craloansurvey/cratext.pdf. For current CRA regulations see
12 C.F.R. § 228.21-29 (2010).
62. Husock, supra note 54.
63. Brescia, supra note 56, at 633.
64. Id. at 632.
65. Brescia, supra note 56, at 643-44.
66. Glenn B. Canner et al., Does the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Cause
Banks to Provide a Subsidy to Some Mortgage Borrowers?, 2002 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RES. FIN. & ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES 1, 7-8.
67. Brescia, supra note 56, at 654.
68. Id. at 653.
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1990s to increase enforcement of CRA requirements.6 9 However, these
efforts were insufficient. Accordingly, because of these and other issues,
in 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton pushed for changes in the CRA that
made the criteria easier to understand, made the forms easier for banks to
file, and placed an increased focus on the actual lending.
70
The efficacy of CRA requirements is decidedly mixed when analyz-
ing the goal of increased access to mortgage financing for LMI families.
On the one hand, as Ben Bernanke has stated, "[r]esearch on the CRA
has tended to find positive net effects, but the results are not uniform."
7 1
Literature reviews, along with studies based on CRA discussion groups,
have reached similar findings. 72 Moreover, there are several studies whose
findings imply no effect of the CRA on lending to LMI communities.
Christopher Berry and Sarah Lee found no CRA effect on lending when
comparing "matched pairs" of houses where one is just above the CRA
threshold and one is just below.73 Jeffery Gunther found that, between
1993 and 1997, CRA-covered lenders increased their mortgage origina-
tions to non-LMI borrowers more than to LMI borrowers while non-
CRA-covered lenders exhibited the opposite results.74 As Bernanke has
also noted, "some critical studies have argued that the CRA has been
ineffective in addressing discrimination and market failures and that its
social costs outweigh its benefits."
7 5
Few studies on the CRA were available before 1993 due to a lack of
publicly available information on independent mortgage companies. 76 In
fact, one reason there may have been an increase in lending under the
CRA was the release of public CRA data in 1990, which not only placed
69. Rheingold et al., supra note 15, at 649. Along with the increased enforcement,
there were also several new initiatives to promote LMI homeownership, most notably
Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE). Id.
70. Liz Laderman, Has the CRA Increased Lending for Low-Income Home
Purchases?, 2004-16 FED. RES. BANK OF SAN FRANcisco ECON. LETTER 1, 2-3 (2004),
available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/200 4 /el200 4 -16.html.
The Clinton Administration also initiated a National Home Ownership Strategy focusing
on increasing access to credit. See Rheingold et al., supra note 15, at 649.
71. Bernanke, supra note 53.
72. See Eric S. Belsky et al., Insights into the Practice of Community Reinvestment Act
Lending: A Synthesis of CRA Discussion Groups 4 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working
Paper No. CRA00-1, 2000); Brescia, supra note 56, at 638.
73. Neil Bhutta, Giving Credit where Credit is Due? The Community Reinvestment
Act and Mortgage Lending in Lower-Income Neighborhoods 5 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. and
Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2008-61, 2008) (citing Christopher R.
Berry & Sarah L. Lee, The Community Reinvestment Act: A Regression Discontinuity Analy-
sis (Univ. of Chicago, Harris Sch., Working Paper No. 07.04, 2007)).
74. Laderman, supra note 70, at 2 (citing Jeffery W. Gunther, Should CRA Stand
for 'Community Redundancy Act?, 23 REGULATION 56, 58 (2000)).
75. Bernanke, supra note 53. See also Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J.
ON REG. 121, 233 (2004); Keith N. Hylton, Development Lending and the Community
Reinvestment Act, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 59, 62-64 (2006).
76. Laderman, supra note 70, at 1.
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pressure on banks to lend to LMI borrowers to avoid potentially negative
publicity, but also served to strengthen community organizations' push
for increased lending.7 7 CRA discussion-based groups reveal that regula-
tory factors leading to increased CRA lending included the Federal
Reserve's Board of Governors' 1989 denial of a merger request by Conti-
nental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago "on the
ground that the bank had not met its obligations under the CRA";
increased Congressional pressure to enforce the CRA in the early 1990s;
and the changes to the CRA instituted under President Clinton in
1995.78
More recent studies, however, do find a significant effect of the
CRA on LMI mortgage lending. 79 Along with this finding, researchers
note that lenders subject to the CRA originate a higher portion of loans
to LMI borrowers and neighborhoods where there is active community
organization focused on promoting the expansion of credit than to areas
lacking community involvement.8 " This could explain some increases in
LMI lending, as CRA agreements increased significantly after President
Clinton's reform-from $150 billion in 1995 to $397 billion in 1997.1
Also, researchers find that CRA lenders make a higher portion of loans in
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) where a higher percentage of the
areas within those MSAs are CRA assessment areas.8 2 Ellen Seidman,
director of the federal Office of Thrift Supervision, said in a speech
before the Greenlining Institute in 2001, "Our record home ownership
rate [increasing from 64.2% in 1994 to 68% in 2001], I'm convinced,
77. Eric S. Belsky et al., The Effect of the Community Reinvestment Act on Bank and
Thrift Home Purchase Mortgage Lending 10 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper
No. CRAO1-1, 2001) [hereinafter Belsky et al., Effect of the CRA].
78. Id. at 11, 13, 14. The CRA regulations adopted in 1995 established for large
institutions a three-pronged test based on performance in the areas of lending, invest-
ments, and services. See Bernanke, supra note 5. While the regulations placed the greatest
emphasis on lending, they encouraged innovative approaches to addressing community
development credit needs. Id. Several provisions were included to reduce compliance
costs, among them a new rule that allowed small banks to meet their requirements by
means of a streamlined examination focused on lending activities. Id; see also Press Brief-
ing by Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Rubin, Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy, & Eugene Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency (Dec. 8, 1993),
available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1993/12/1993-12-08-briefing-by-bentsen-and-
rubin.text.html.
79. Belsky et al., Effect of the CRA, supra note 77, at 1; Stuart A. Gabriel & Stuart
S. Rosenthal, Government-Sponsored Enterprises, the Community Reinvestment Act, and
Home Ownership in Targeted Underserved Neighborhoods, HOUSING MARKETS AND THE
ECONOMY: RISK, REGULATION, AND POLICY 202, 210 (Edward L. Glaeser & John M.
Quigley eds., 2009) (citing Raphael Bostick & Breck L. Robinson, Do CRA Agreements
Increase Lending?, 31 REAL EST. ECON. 23 (2003)).
80. Belsky et al., Effect of the CRA, supra note 77, at 2.
81. Banks Pledge More Loans in Minority Communities, WALL ST. J., March 20,
1998.
82. Belsky et al., Effect of the CRA, supra note 77, at 1-2.
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would not have been reached without CRA and its close relative, the
Fannie/Freddie requirements."
8 3
Possible explanations for the increase in CRA activity are the emer-
gence of larger, more experienced firms who were able to more efficiently
handle CRA loans, and a booming economy that made the risk of lower-
and moderate- income applicants appear lower to banks.8 4 Another rea-
son cited as leading to increased LMI mortgages is a wave of consolida-
tion in the financial industry, which increased banks' incentives to avoid
potential merger application denials.8 5 However, banks walked a fine line
when the loans purporting to comply with CRA requirements could also
be viewed as predatory or abusive. An illustrative case is the Citigroup/
EAB merger. Although the merger was approved, the Fed stated that
"[b]orrowers do not benefit from expanded access to credit if the credit
involves abusive lending practices."86
One concern with these studies is that they do not address whether
CRA mortgage originations crowd out mortgage originations from non-
CRA lenders.8 7 The evidence is mixed on this "crowding out" argument.
Although one could argue that CRA mortgage lending crowds out mort-
gage origination to LMI borrowers by firms that are not subject to the
CRA, one researcher finds no crowd-out effect in the data and instead
finds a slight "crowd-in effect" in areas with previously low home sale
rates.
88
However, despite these findings, one continuing theme with the
CRA is the interaction between an increasing portion of LMI mortgage
loans made to borrowers not covered by the CRA, and the galloping
growth of the subprime market. As discussed below, the biggest market
in these neighborhoods is subprime lending.8 9 Interestingly, most CRA
banks are not subprime lenders, since an overwhelming majority of sub-
prime lenders are non-bank lenders or mortgage companies. 90 In fact,
CRA does not typically scrutinize the subprime lending activities of non-
bank finance companies, and independent mortgage companies are
83. Edward Pinto, Op-Ed., Acorn and the Housing Bubble: The Liberal Pressure
Group Helped Congress Write the Affirdable Housing Rules That Got Us into Trouble, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 12, 2009, at A23. Mr. Pinto was the chief credit officer at Fannie Mae from
1987 to 1989.
84. Belsky et al., Effect of the CRA, supra note 77, at 14-16.
85. It should be noted though, that the CRA led to larger increases in LMI lend-
ing in areas with banks that were seeking to merge and in more competitive markets
where positive publicity was granted additional importance. Id. at 12, 25.
86. Board of Governors, Order Issued Under Bank Holding Company Act
Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 600 (Sept. 2001).
87. Belsky et al., Effect of the CRA, supra note 77, at 3.
88. Bhutta, supra note 73, at 22.
89. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
90. Engel & McCoy, supra note 55, at 1585.
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exempt from CRA.9 ' A review of the research has shown that the "explo-
sion of new forms of lending, the growing importance of mortgage bro-
kers and mortgage banking operations, and the expansion of secondary
mortgage markets" have reduced the CRA's impact.9 2 The New York
Federal Reserve Bank estimates the CRA effect to have decreased from
3.7% in 1993 to 1.6% in 2000. 9 3 This is not to say that CRA banks are
free from subprime lending, for some estimate that 50% of the high-risk
loans bought by Fannie and Freddie were CRA loans. 94 Furthermore,
CRA fails to penalize lenders that engage in predatory lending (either
directly or through subsidiaries). Some argue that CRA lenders that do
engage in subprime or predatory lending are not meeting the needs of
the community and, at the very least, should not get credit for these
types of loans. 9 5 This landscape may shift further as some community
groups are pressuring Congress to expand CRA to cover all mortgage
lenders, credit unions, insurance companies, and others in the financial
industry.96
It is difficult to arrive at any definitive conclusion regarding whether
changes in government policy in CRA have led to increases in mortgage
originations to urban LMI borrowers. However, the research does seem
to point to the CRA having a slight positive effect on mortgage origina-
tions, though this effect has been confounded in the recent spate of lend-
ing by mortgagees not subject to CRA. Because the CRA only covers a
small percentage of mortgages now originated to LMI borrowers, it
would be interesting to see if the CRA would still have an effect if all
mortgage originators were subject to the CRA. It would also be interest-
ing to see if one could show whether President Clinton's changes in 1995
directly led to increased mortgage lending for LMI borrowers or whether
increases were due to subprime lending which escaped the purview of the
CRA. It is possible that larger metropolitan areas have received most of
the benefits of the CRA for varied reasons that could include more regu-
latory oversight, more established community groups ready to protest
transactions and push for CRA agreements, and/or increased value of
goodwill in a competitive market. Although much of the data has been
done on a national scale, more research needs to be done on the effects of
the CRA within individual metropolitan areas.
91. Id. at 1588.
92. JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE COMMuIJTY REINVESTMENT ACT: ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN AN EVOLVING
FINANCIAL SERVICES SYSTEM 8 (2002).
93. William C. Apgar & Mark Duda, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act: Past Accomplishments and Future Regulatory Challenges, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL. REV., 169, 177 (June 2003).
94. Pinto, supra note 83.
95. Engel & McCoy, supra note 55, at 1571, 1585, 1592.
96. Pinto, supra note 83.
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B. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Congress established the housing government-sponsored entities
(GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to increase the flow of funds to
mortgage borrowers.97 Fannie Mae states that its mission is "to provide
liquidity, stability and affordability to the U.S. housing and mortgage
markets." '9 8 The mission of Freddie Mac (created to spur market compe-
tition with Fannie Mae) is analogous. 99 In 1992, the Federal Housing
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act1°° (also known as the
GSE Act) was signed, increasing the requirements for Fannie's and Fred-
die's purchases of low-income mortgages, and allowing the U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to establish
"affordable housing goals" for the GSEs.'0 l
This set the stage for Fannie and Freddie to acquire more than $6
trillion of single-family housing loans over the next sixteen years.'0 2 Con-
sistent with increases in goals for lower-income housing, the GSEs, espe-
cially after the 1992 regulations, increased their purchases of LMI
mortgages. From 1992 to 1995, Fannie Mae increased its share of lower-
income mortgages by 100%, while Freddie Mac increased its share by
50%.1°3 In a foreboding cloud, there is evidence to support the charge
that Fannie and Freddie were buying risky loans in 1993, and routinely
misrepresenting the loan quality as "prime," when in fact the loans were
subprime (or Alt-A).' 04
In 1999, Fannie was pushed to start a pilot program to increase
access to credit for LMI homebuyers.105 Fannie prided itself on a sophis-
ticated computer program that would give credit comfort by accurately
assessing credit risk. Armed with this technological capability, Fannie
announced in 2000 that it would buy $2 trillion worth of loans from
97. Federal Subsidies for the Housing GSEs: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives, 107th Cong. 1 (May 23, 2001) (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Director,
Congressional Budget Office), available at http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=2839&
type=0.
98. Fannie Mae, About Us, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=home&c=
aboutus (last visited May 23, 2010).
99. Freddie Mac, Our Mission, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_
profile/ourmission (last visited May 23, 2010).
100. Pub. L. No. 102-550, tit. XIII (Government Sponsored Entities),
§§ 1301-95, 106 Stat. 3672, 3941-4012 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501 et
seq. (2006)).
101. Gabriel & Rosenthal, supra note 79, at 207.
102. Pinto, supra note 83.
103. Gabriel & Rosenthal, supra note 79, at 211.
104. Peter J. Wallison, Op-Ed., The Price for Fannie and Freddie Keeps Going Up,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2009, at A17.
105. Steven A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999, at A28.
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low-income, minority, and risky borrowers by 2010.1°6 This shift in GSE
policy toward LMI loans was further encouraged under President George
W. Bush. In 2002, the Bush administration challenged the GSEs to
increase their minority commitment goals by more than $440 billion. 17
The administration also encouraged the financial sector to create innova-
tive products to promote homeownership and supported efforts for a
zero-down payment F1-A loan program.'""
These increases in loan purchases did not necessarily translate into
increases in home mortgages to LMI families. In a 2000 study, Stuart
Gabriel and Stuart Rosenthal ran a model that isolated the effects of the
CRA and GSEs on LMI homeownership. Their model found "a small
positive CRA effect" on local homeownership rates. ° 9 However, their
model found "essentially no evidence" of an effect of GSEs' home loan
purchasing on homeownership in LMI communities."'
Other studies of loans during the late 1990s have also had difficul-
ties finding evidence of GSEs' effects on LMI home mortgage origina-
tions. In a study analyzing the mortgage markets in the largest 308 MSAs
between 1995 and 1999, Brent Ambrose and Thomas Thibodeau were
only able to find that GSEs led to expansions in the credit market for
LMI borrowers in 1998.11i Another study by Raphael Bostic and Stuart
Gabriel specifically looked at housing outcomes in California and found
"little efficacy of the GSE home loan purchase goals in elevating the
homeownership and housing conditions of targeted and underserved
neighborhoods." ' 1 2 A study that evaluated the effects of GSEs in Cleve-
land also found no evidence of their efficacy.i3
However, this picture changed after 2004 when Fannie and Freddie
(after a big push by neighborhood groups and HUD) added a great deal
of flexibility to their underwriting guidelines and expanded the scope of
106. Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at Al [hereinafter Duhigg, Pressured].
107. Bush Aims to Boost Minority Home Ownership, CNN.coM, June 17, 2002,
available at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/06/17 /bush.minority.homes/
index.html.
108. Dickerson, supra note 2, at 193.
109. Gabriel & Rosenthal, supra note 79, at 205.
110. Id.
111. Brent W. Ambrose & Thomas G. Thibodeau, Have the GSEAfrdable Hous-
ing Goals Increased the Supply of Mortgage Credit?, 34 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 263,
271 (2004).
112. Raphael W. Bostic & Stuart A. Gabriel, Do the GSEs Matter to Low-Income
Housing Markets? An Assessment of the Effects of the GSE Loan Purchase Goals on California
Housing Outcomes, 59 J. URJ3. EcON. 458, 458 (2006).
113. Xudong An & Raphael W. Bostic, GSE Activity, FHA Feedback, and Implica-
tions for the Efficacy of the Affordable Housing Goals, 36 J. REAL EST. FIN. & EcON. 207,
209-10 (2008) (citing Lance Freeman, George Galster & Ron Malega, The Impact of
Secondary Mortgage Market and GSE Purchases on Underserved Neighborhood Markets: A
Cleveland Case Study, 42 URB. AFF. REv. 193 (2006)).
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loans eligible for securitization. Under the "American Dream Commit-
ment," Fannie pledged to finance six million new homeowners, including
1.8 million new minority homeowners by 2014.1 14 To achieve that goal,
Fannie announced that it would increase the average annual number of
minority first-time homebuyers it financed by 93,000 households (more
than double the previous four years' averages).' '5 President Bush boosted
the affordable housing goal from 50% to 56%, and challenged Fannie
and Freddie, saying they "must do more."' 16 To address directly the
dearth of lending to those on the bottom of the economic spectrum,
HUD imposed further requirements on Fannie and Freddie in 2005. It
mandated that 32% of their loan portfolios must be to borrowers in cen-
tral cities (or other underserved areas), and that 22% of the loans must be
to very-low-income families or to borrowers living in very low-income
neighborhoods." 7 By 2008, 47% of the GSEs' purchases of mortgages
were LMI loans, compared to 45% in 2005.118
Alongside these changes, however, the seeds for disaster were sown.
The disconnect between policy imperatives to increase homeownership
and the economic reality of the borrowers in the pool exploded the sub-
prime market. The first pull into the waters of less-than-prime lending
occurred in 1995, when HUD agreed to allow Fannie and Freddie to get
affordable housing credit for buying subprime securities." 9 The expan-
sion in lending went hand-in-hand with the increase in exposure to risk.
By 2004, Fannie and Freddie's purchases of subprime loans had risen
tenfold.'12  Between 2005 and 2008, Fannie purchased or guaranteed
more than $270 billion in risky loans-more than three times as much as
in all earlier years combined.12' This increase in subprime loans was by
design-not by happenstance. Internal Fannie documents from 2006
state the objective of increasing "our penetration into the subprime mar-
ket."' 2 2 Some former Fannie employees express regret in moving so
114. Robert J. Levin, Forward to Demetrios Papademetriou & Brian Ray, From
Homeland to a Home: Immigrants and Homeownership in Urban America, 2004 FANNIE
MAE PAPERS 1, available at http://www.ilw.com/articles/2004,0804-Papademetriou.pdf.
115. Id.
116. Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed The Crisis: Subprime Loans
Labeled Affordable', WASH. POST, June 10, 2008, at Al. Likewise, Capitol Hill (especially
Democratic lawmakers) prompted Fannie to increase its lending to LMI borrowers. See
Charles Duhigg, The Reckoning Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at Al.
117. Husock, supra note 54.
118. U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEV., OVERVIEW OF THE GSEs' HOUSING
GOAL PERFORMANCE, 2000-2007 6 (2009).
119. Leonigg, supra note 116.
120. Id.
121. Duhigg, Pressured, supra note 106.
122. David S. Hilzenrath, Fannie's Perilous Pursuit of Subprime Loans: In an
Attempt to Increase Its Business, Company Gave the Risks Short Shrift, WASH. POST, Aug.
19, 2008, at Dl.
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deeply into the subprime market, 123 and ask whether by enticing borrow-
ers into dangerous subprime loans Fannie was "setting them up for fail-
ure."' 24 Others stand by the decision, disputing allegations of abusive
lending and sloppy underwriting by claiming that they could not have
predicted that subprime lending would dominate the market so
quickly. 1
25
Fannie and Freddie lost their quasi-independent status in 2008,
when the federal government took over both agencies. Most studies on
the GSEs are based on data before the 1999 relaxation of credit standards
and the 2004 expansion in LMI lending goals. It may be worthwhile to
recreate studies based on data after both of these events. One might
doubt that the legacy of the softening of credit is increased homeowner-
ship. In fact, recent data confirmed that a significant proportion of the
subprime loans were not used to push people from the rental market into
homeownership. These loans were used by existing homeowners to re-
finance their homes or as a home equity loan. Nationwide, between 1998
and 2006, only 1.4 million of 15.1 million subprime loans were made to
first-time homebuyers. 1 26 Furthermore, as to city homeowners, any gains
that were achieved through this effort (and, perhaps even more troubling,
the significant gains made before 2000) were washed away completely in
a foreclosure tsunami.
127
III. SUBPRIME MORTGAGE PENETRATION IN CITY HOMEOWNERSHIP
As alluded to above, the mortgage loans made in many city neigh-
borhoods escaped CRA compliance, as they were not made by banks
subject to the CRA. 128 Financial service firms and mortgage companies
dominated the market. 129 When programs such as the CRA were created,
it might have been inconceivable that these same neighborhoods could,
in fact, have too much credit. 1 3' However, while facially serving the
needs of the community with access to capital, this access came at the
very high price of so-called "subprime" lending. No discussion of city
homeownership can be complete without integrating the effect of the
penetration of subprime mortgages. Numerous studies have confirmed
that for decades, minority neighborhoods experienced a significant con-
123. William C. Apgar Jr., who was an assistant HUD secretary under Clinton,
said he regrets allowing the companies to count subprime securities as affordable. See
Leonnig, supra note 116.
124. Hilzenrath, supra note 122 (quoting Fannie Mae Executive Vice President
Thomas A. Lund).
125. Leonnig, supra note 116 (quoting HUD Spokesman Brian Sullivan).
126. Dickerson, supra note 2, at 209.
127. See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
128. See supra Part II.A.
129. Dickerson, supra note 2, at 203-06.
130. Engel & McCoy, supra note 55, at 1571.
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centration of subprime loans. 13 1 In fact, HUD recognized the problem
more than ten years ago. In 1998, it determined that subprime loans
were over five times more likely to occur in a Black neighborhood than in
a White neighborhood.13 2
Of course, a borrower may be unable to obtain a loan on traditional
terms (e.g., thirty-year, fixed-market-rate) due to many factors, not the
least of which is creditworthiness of the borrower. One possible explana-
tion for such concentration is the possibility of greater incidences of low
credit scores within particular subpopulations. However, even taking into
consideration the possibility that minority borrowers might have a lower
average credit score still does not fully account for the disproportionate
percentage of subprime loans in minority neighborhoods. Studies have
shown that even after taking into consideration the creditworthiness of
the borrower, the percentage of minority homeowners in the neighbor-
hood (in that particular study, specifically African American neighbor-
hoods) is positively correlated with the subprime share of loans. 133
In another study, different authors came to the same conclusion:
racial disparities affect whether a borrower obtains a subprime loan. 134
Their study led the researchers to conclude that "[r]egardless of whether
we call it efficient risk-based pricing or invitation to predatory abuse,
subprime mortgage lending is tightly bound up with the enduring racial-
geographic inequalities of American housing."1 35 What differentiates the
previous era of subprime lending from the present environment is not so
much the economic disparity in the loan terms but rather the higher
incidence of foreclosure. 136 In other words, while past lending patterns
may have resulted in minority homeowners paying higher costs for home
financing, subprime loans of a more recent vintage have wreaked their
havoc when homeowners have been unable to pay, resulting in loss of the
home by the borrower and loss to the neighborhood with a now-aban-
doned home.
The effect of the recent meltdown in the subprime market was
acutely felt in minority neighborhoods. In 2004, 2005, and 2006 (the
height of the subprime lending era) white borrowers certainly partici-
pated fully in the market. They accounted for slightly more than half of
131. For a complete discussion, see Paul S. Calem et. al., The Neighborhood Distri-
bution of Subprime Mortgage Lending, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 393, 394 (2004).
132. HUD documented that in 1998, subprime lending accounted for 51% of
loans in Black neighborhoods. and only 9% of loans in predominately White neighbor-
hoods. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME & RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA 2 (2000).
133. Calem et. al. supra note 131, at 401.
134. ELVIN K. WYLY ET. AL., UNIV. OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, SUBPRIME MORT-
GAGE SEGMENTATION IN THE AMERICAN URBAN SYSTEM, 21-22 (2007).
135. Id. at 26.
136. Kristopher Gerardi & Paul Willen, Subprime Mortgages, Foreclosures, and
Urban Neighborhoods, 9 B .E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y Article 12, 10 (2009).
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the subprime loans originated in 2004-2006.137 However, a clearer pic-
ture of the impact of subprime lending emerges when a different ques-
tion is posed: what percentage of borrowers (according to racial
demographics) were subprime borrowers?
TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE OF SUBPRIME BORROWERS
BY SELECTED RACIAL DEMOGRAPHICS
1 38
2004 2005 2006
Black 31% 51% 53%
Hispanic 18% 38% 41%
White 8% 19% 22%
If we focus the analysis on urban homeownership, the analysis
becomes even starker. There is a far wider geographic dispersion of white
borrowers across city, suburban and even rural areas. In contrast, Black
and Latino borrowers concentrate in the urban core.1 39 Racially segre-
gated and concentrated living patterns exacerbate the effect of the sub-
prime crisis in minority neighborhoods. There is a steady increase in the
percentage of subprime loans as the neighborhood composition becomes
more concentrated by minorities. Building on trends identified in several
studies from the early 1990s through 2004, minority neighborhoods
experienced a strong geographic concentration of subprime mortgages. 14o
Moreover, several studies have shown that even when controlling for the
income and credit scores of these neighborhoods, subprime mortgages
are concentrated in locations with high proportions of Black and His-
panic residents.14 1 In 2006, if a neighborhood was less than 10% minor-
ity, 22% of the residential loans were classified as subprime. By contrast,
if the neighborhood was 90-100% minority, 48% of borrowers were
subprime borrowers. 142 The ironic twist to this scenario is that, accord-
ing to some estimates, 30% of subprime borrowers could have qualified
137. Maurice Jourdain-Earl, The Demographic Impact of the Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown 13(2008), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.orglfiles/Conferencesl
2008/RegulatoryComplianceConferenceO8/RCO8SEPT25DEMOMauriceJourdain.pdf.
138. Id. at 8.
139. Id. at 26.
140. Calem et al., supra note 131, at 401.
141. Chris Mayer & Karen Pence, Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and to
Whom? 3, 14, 29 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No.
2008-29, 2008). "Even controlling for credit scores and other Zip code characteristics,
race and ethnicity appear to be strongly and statistically significantly related to the pro-
portion of subprime loans." Id. at 14. For a discussion of earlier subprime lending, where
the same pattern holds true, see also Calem et. al., supra note 131, at 401.
142. Jourdain-Earl, supra note 137, at 11.
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for safer, lower-cost prime loans but instead were steered to the subprime
market. 14 3
HOLC maps geographically represent race-based lending. For
example, the HOLC map for Philadelphia paints minority neighbor-
hoods red.' 4 4 Remaining in Philadelphia, these same neighborhoods
tend to exhibit a higher incidence of subprime mortgages.
145
While it is true that subprime lending can help make homeowner-
ship a reality for many who would not otherwise qualify for mortgage
financing, subprime lending can also lead to homeownership loss. Gener-
ally, subprime borrowers exceed the 30% maximum federal housing
affordability guidelines for housing costs. In 2007, subprime borrowers
spent approximately 37% of their after-tax income on mortgage pay-
ments, insurance and property taxes. 14 6 Devoting such a large portion of
income to housing costs put borrowers, who were already stretching their
resources thin to achieve homeowner status, into a precarious financial
position. The more recent wave of subprime lending contained an even
bigger threat to borrower stability: the emergence of teaser-rate adjustable
mortgages. While the subprime loans of previous vintage may have car-
ried high interest rates (and hence were still subject to charges that they
were predatory), subprime loans of more recent origination were
designed to require the borrower to refinance within twelve to twenty-
four months, or the rate would reset to one that generally outstripped the
payment ability of the borrowers. Hence, mortgage foreclosures spiked
when the market softened and interest rates rose.
Losses to individual homeowners have been staggering. A paper by
the Center for Responsible Lending notes homeownership gains to
50,925 for first-time African American homebuyers and 72,981 for first-
time Latino homebuyers, but projects a homeownership loss of 98,025
for African Americans and 110,674 for Latinos based on a total of
1,075,770 subprime loans issued to minorities in 2005.'17 According to
a study of neighborhoods in Boston in 2007, almost half of the changes
in ownership in Black-owned housing were a result of foreclosure.' 48
Although there is debate as to whether subprime lending actually
increased the absolute number of minority homeowners, the impact of
143. Leonnig, supra note 116.
144. HOLC map on file with author,
145. See Paul Milstein Ctr. For Real Estate, Columbia Business School, Subprime
Google Earth Maps, http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/realestate/research/housingcrisis/sub
primemaps (last visited June 21, 2010).
146. Dickerson, supra note 2, at 207.
147. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CRL ISSUE PAPER No. 14, SUBPRIME
LENDING: A NET DRAIN ON HOMEOWNERSHIP 4 (2007), available at http://www.
responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/Net-Drain-in-Home-Owner-
ship.pdf.
148. Gerardi & Willen, supra note 136, at 18.
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foreclosure is beyond debate. The loss of equity to subprime borrowers of
color is estimated to be nearly a quarter of a trillion dollars.'
49
The effect on other minority neighborhoods has been equally devas-
tating. In Chicago, "neighborhoods where the population is more than
80 percent non-white account for 65 percent of all [foreclosure] cases, up
from 61 percent in 1993."' 15' This trend is not unique to Illinois; it has
appeared in many major metropolitan areas across the country. One
study in Cleveland and surrounding Cuyahoga County found that census
tracts with a high proportion of African American borrowers correlate to
the highest incidence of foreclosure of subprime loans. 15 1 Similar tales
can be told in cities such as Atlanta and Philadelphia. ' 52 Cities with large
minority populations also suffered from the effects of high foreclosure
rates experienced by minority communities. Losses to these cities include
decreased tax bases, increased police and fire commitments, and other
social pathologies (including community displacement) that follow clus-
ters of properties left vacant and neglected as a result of foreclosure.
1 53
In response to the wave of foreclosures, citizens and cities have
brought suits against lenders.' 54 The allegations go to the heart of the
lending crisis. Individual homeowners have challenged subprime lenders,
alleging that they were "sold an exotic high cost adjustable rate mortgage
(ARM) . . . without consideration of [their] ability to pay the loan's
hidden maximum interest rate, which far exceeded the initial teaser rate
and made the loan unaffordable"; that lenders targeted "financially dis-
tressed consumers with the intent of artificially inflating their earnings
and without regard to whether borrowers could repay the loans"; and
that lenders "knowingly and affirmatively misrepresented the most impor-
tant measurement of the affordability of a mortgage product: the total
amount of each monthly installment on the loan relative to the borrowers
existing debt to income ratio." 155 Another case charged that the borrowers
were qualified for a loan with better terms but that the lender paid a
149. Powell, supra note 43, at 624.
150. Vikas Bijaj & Ron Nixon, For Minorities, Signs of Trouble in Foreclosures, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at Al.
151. CLAUDIA COULTON ET AL., CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIV., PATHWAYS TO
FORECLOSURE: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF MORTGAGE LOANS, CLEVELAND AND
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, 2005-2008, at 14 (2008).
152. Bijaj & Nixon, supra note 150.
153. See Richard E. Gottlieb & Andrew J. McGuinness, Subprime Lending As a
Public Nuisance: Casting Blame on Mortgage Lenders and Wall Street for Inner City Blight,
62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REv. 4, 6 (2008).
154. State attorneys general have also filed suit against unscrupulous lenders. See
Justin Collins, Without Other Options: The Limited Effectiveness, Unique Availability, and
Overall Impact of State-Directed Lawsuits Against Predatory Lenders, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 231,
233 (2008).
155. See Biggins v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 09-01272, 2009 WL 2246199, at
*30-31 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009) (citing Second Amended Complaint) (emphasis in
original).
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mortgage broker to arrange a loan with less favorable terms.'5 6 However,
these individual lawsuits, and even class action suits, have failed to gain
traction in the judicial system, where they have floundered on procedural
grounds. 15
7
Some cities have taken a proactive stance. Both Baltimore and
Cleveland have filed suits challenging lending practices of major banks in
predominately minority neighborhoods.15 s They allege damages to the
cities stemming from vacancies, decreased property tax revenue, and
increased fire and police costs, and public nuisance. Neither case has had
its final disposition. However, the arguments raised by Baltimore and
Cleveland against banks such as Wells Fargo and Deutsche Bank are
interesting because the underlying premise is that lending was not an
economic decision but rather a political/racial decision. As noted above,
several studies have shown that subprime mortgages are concentrated in
locations with high proportions of Black and Latino residents, even con-
trolling for the income and credit scores of these neighborhoods. This
lends considerable credibility to the position of the cities that lenders
have, once more, engaged in discriminatory lending practices.
Although some commentators have highlighted the paradoxical159
and tautological' 60 aspects of the cities' cases, 6 ' these accusations only
have merit if the underwriting of the loans was based solely on financial
criteria. Study after study has shown that there is more than economics at
play here. Yes, the cities are "walking a fine line, " 162 but individual own-
ers bringing suit lack efficiency to tackle large-scale problems. Interven-
156. Weller v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. No. 08-2798, 2009 WL 928522, at
*3 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2009).
157. For example, the Biggins complaint suffered from a lack of specificity, and
plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss by the granting of leave to amend complaint.
Biggins, 2009 WL 2246199, at *65. The Plaintiffs in the Weller complaint likewise were
granted leave to re-file their complaint with more information and specificity. Weller,
2009 WL 928522, at *21-22.
158. City of Cleveland v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 571 F. Supp. 2d 807, 810
(N.D. Ohio 2008); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. JFM
1:08 CV-00062, 2010 WL 46401, *1-2 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 2010). Also, the city of Phila-
delphia took an interesting (though likely illegal) approach: the sheriff of Philadelphia
refused to conduct court-ordered foreclosure auctions on homeowners even though his
office is charged with the sole responsibility of conducting these auctions. See Raymond
H. Brescia, On Public Plaintiff and Private Harms: The Standing of Municipalities in
Climate Change, Firearms, and Financial Crisis Litigation, 24 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics &
Pub. Pol'y 7, 21-28 (2010); Michael M. Phillips, He's Taking Law Into His Own Hands To
Help Broke Homeowners: Trouble Is, He is the Law; Phillys Sheriff Green Doesn't Do Foreclo-
sures, to Lenders' Dismay, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2008, at Al.
159. Subprime borrowers are thought to be a more risky investment, so there
should be no surprise when the loans go into default.
160. Loan underwriting is irresponsible when a subprime borrower defaults
because they cannot afford the loan.
161. Gottlieb & McGuinness, supra note 153, at 8-9.
162. Id. at 6.
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tion by the cities allows the courts to address the wider societal
ramifications of subprime mortgage penetration in urban minority
neighborhoods. The foreclosures are a symptom; continued racial and
ethnic profiling is the underlying problem.
16 3
IV. RETHINKING THE PATH OF URBAN HOMEOWNERSHIP
This section begins with an assumption: as it pertains to metropoli-
tan residential patterns, there is a conflation of race/ethnicity and socio-
economic status that permits the discussion to be as much about race/
ethnicity as it is about class. There is ample evidence of some minority
penetration into suburban neighborhoods. 164 There are some cities
where the people of color do not constitute the majority of the urban
poor."" However, by and large, when we discuss the topic of homeown-
ership in American cities, we are talking about the plight of LMI people
of color. This conflation is especially apt since the root patterns of hous-
ing segregation were explicitly based on race/ethnicity. There may come a
time when race is not a satisfying proxy for socio-economic status (and
vice versa) in the urban core, but that time is not today.
With that caveat in mind, a rethinking of the goal of urban home-
ownership acknowledges that the laudable goals of individual wealth cre-
ation and neighborhood social stability have all but evaporated in light of
the massive foreclosures that have swept across American cities. As one
commentator noted, "It]he oft-stated benefits of homeownership are
largely inconsistent with recent trends that indicate that, for many,
attempting to become a homeowner is a painfully short and ultimately
unwise investment. "16 6 The similarities shown above between the HOLC
map and the foreclosure map indicate that minority neighborhoods are
once more being shut out of the homeownership market. After this
sobering acknowledgement, the dichotomy between place-based strate-
gies and people-based strategies becomes relevant. 16 7
163. Dickerson sees the problem slightly differently. To her, the problem is "an
irrational obsession with attaining the status of homeownership." Dickerson, supra note
2, at 232. While I do not disagree with her premise, I submit that the foreclosure rate
that disproportionately plagues city minority neighborhoods could have been diminished
with non-racially based lending criteria.
164. Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A
Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America 9 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Work-
ing Paper No. 241245, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/papers.tafabstractid=
241245 [hereinafter Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs]. See also Sheryll D. Cashin,
Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to
New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2048 (2000).
165. For example, Portland, Salt Lake City, and Seattle. See Cashin, Middle-Class
Black Suburbs, supra note 164, at 16.
166. Dickerson, supra note 2, at 207.
167. There is one mixed strategy that combined place- and people-based focuses.
Farmers Home was a mortgage guarantee program providing low-cost loans to people in
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Place-based homeownership strategies focus on empowering neigh-
borhoods. Examples from previous programs include the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act,' 68 the CRA, Public Housing Demonstration (a
Reagan-era program providing for the sale of public housing units to
tenants), Nehemiah,' 6 9 and HOME.1 7 ° People-based strategies focus on
empowering the individual. 171 Examples from previous programs include
the FHA, VA, Fannie and Freddie Mac, Section 235, ECOA, the
National Homeowner Strategy, and the Blueprint for the American
Dream.172
As it relates to urban homeownership, none of these programs can
be deemed a resounding success. What little impact some programs
might have had was lost in the foreclosure crisis. 173 The stubborn truth
about place-based initiatives is that they do not allow for wealth creation
due to neighborhood limitations. The stubborn truth about people-based
initiatives is that those who can afford to leave the distressed area leave;
those who cannot afford to leave are forced to remain in marginal neigh-
borhoods with financial instability. Such parallelism crystallizes the
choice of goals in urban homeownership programs: to help people or to
help neighborhoods. While it is difficult to do both simultaneously, we
have suffered through choosing one over the other with less-than-
rural areas. However, its rural focus makes it inapplicable to the current discussion. See
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIcULTURE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION
(1989), available at http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rd/70th/history°/o20ofP/20farmers%20
home.pdf. The Farmers Home Administration was restructured as the USDA Rural
Development Program in 1995.
168. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, tit. III, 89
Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 (2006)).
169. Nehemiah is a down payment assistance program. See 24 C.F.R. pt. 280
(2010) (setting forth program regulations).
170. See 24 C.F.R. pt. 92 (2010) (setting forth program regulations).
171. There is a very strong argument to include the tax advantages of home own-
ership as a people-based program. See Joseph Gyourko & Todd Sinai, The Spatial Distri-
bution of Housing-Related Ordinary Income Tax Benefits, 31 REAL EST. EcoN. 527 (2003).
However, since the deductibility of mortgage interest and local taxes depends on the
taxpayer itemizing deductions, this benefit is all but lost for LMI homeowners. Even
those taxpayers itemize the value because the marginal tax rate is lower. See Powell, supra
note 43, at 624.
172. The FHA allows for the purchase of homes with low down payments. The
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs provides a loan guaranty program for veterans. See
U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, Loan Guaranty Home Loan Program, http://www.home
loans.va.gov (last visited June 21, 2010). The ECOA ("Equal Credit Opportunity Act")
prohibits discrimination in the granting of credit. Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 88 Sta.
1500 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006)). The National Homeowner Strategy was a
1994 strategy introduced by Pres. Clinton to overhaul Fannie Mae practices. Blueprint
for the American Dream was an HUD effort to increase minority homeownership by 5.5
million by 2010. See U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEV., BLUEPRINT FOR THE AMER-
CAN DREAM (2003), available at http://archives.hud.gov/initiatives/blueprint/blueprint.
pdf.
173. Powell, supra note 43, at 616.
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resounding results. One avenue of inquiry might be to split the middle
with ideas such as shared ownership, subsidized co-ops with limited
transferability, and shared appreciation financing. 174 However, these
ideas tend to be impractical on a wide-scale basis.
If the choice is to promote place-based policies, the first order at
hand would be to eliminate differences between cities and suburbs. Previ-
ous attempts at place-based strategies have left intact the legacy advan-
tages enjoyed by the suburbs and have instead focused on subsidizing the
urban core.' 75 One solution might be to go the other way and strip the
suburbs of the value of past policies in order to level the playing field.
Gone are the disparities between federal highway dollars and subsidies for
mass transit. Zoning and land use laws would be regionalized. In this
way, cities can compete for more of the share of metropolitan homeown-
ers. On the other hand, some commentators have advocated abandoning
people-based homeownership programs all together. Instead of incen-
tivizing homeownership for urban residents, they argue, housing policy
should focus on providing quality affordable rental housing. 176 This
approach accepts that some people should not be homeowners but still
have the right to decent, affordable housing. Since suburbs can success-
fully zone out low-income rental housing, 77 this makes the city the
repository of the metropolitan poor renters. Both extremes are not only
politically unfeasible, but also unsatisfying from a social welfare
perspective.
It might be instructive to turn attention away from the housing
purchase market and look at the rental housing market. Here the same
people/place decisions are made. To address the multitude of social, eco-
nomic and legal woes of mass-produced public housing, several policies
regarding the housing of the nation's poor have arisen. For example, poli-
cies such as the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program 178 and Moving to
Opportunity (MTO) 179 are both people-based programs. Both programs
174. For more ideas in this vein, see Byrne & Diamond, supra note 9, at 547.
175. See supra note 168-72 and accompanying text.
176. Dickerson, supra note 2, at 233-34.
177. This is subject to any limitations that might be in place, such as Mount
Laurel-type fair share regulations, which prohibit states and municipalities from discrimi-
nating against lower-income residents in their land use planning.
178. A metropolitan-wide remedy to "white flight" by dispersing lower income
tenants in Chicago was upheld in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 286 (1976). For
discussion, see Poindexter, Collective Individualism, supra note 14, at 628.
179. Five cities (Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York) were
chosen to participate in this program under Section 152 of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1992. Pub. L. No. 102-550 §152, 106 Stat. 3672 (1992). See also
U.S. Dep't Hous. & Urban Dev., Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing, http://por-
tal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/programdescription/mto ("Moving to Opportunity
for Fair Housing (MTO) is a 10-year research demonstration that combines tenant-based
rental assistance with housing counseling to help very low-income families move from
poverty-stricken urban areas to low-poverty neighborhoods.")
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build upon the Section 8 voucher program that empowers tenants to find
housing outside of traditional public housing projects. The important
step that Gautreaux and MTO take is that both explicitly push residents
outside their urban neighborhoods and into more economically diverse
neighborhoods-even into the suburbs. In contrast, HOPE VI is a place-
based strategy that targets the nation's worst public housing projects. The
projects are demolished (or substantially renovated), and the resulting
development has both low-income and market-rate units for rent.' 8 '
Existing tenants are given the opportunity to return.'
81
A. Homeownership Zone Program
One ownership program that began to tie together both people- and
place-based strategies is the Homeownership Zone demonstration pro-
ject. Utilizing New Urbanist concepts, in 1996 HUD, under Secretary
Henry Cisneros, launched the Homeownership Zone (HOZ) demonstra-
tion program as part of a national strategy to expand homeownership. Its
goal is to subsidize homeownership while building economic and social
capital in the neighborhood by facilitating new housing construction or
substantial rehabilitation. According to the HUD website,
[t]he goal of the HOZ initiative is to test the idea that cities can
transform their blighted areas into vibrant communities by creat-
ing entire new neighborhoods of mixed-income single-family
homes, called Homeownership Zones. Homeownership Zones
usually consist of several hundred new homes in a concentrated
target area near major employment centers.' 8 2
HUD issued an interim report on the initiative in 2007 indicating that,
on the whole, the program achieved its goal of providing opportunities to
LMI families and market rate buyers in the purchase of their first
home. 18
3
HOZ is a demonstration project with funding of $50 million.
HUD money was leveraged with private capital and public capital from
other sources. Eleven cities were granted funding for their projects, 8 '
180. For a complete description, see Jerry J. Salama, The Redevelopment of Dis-
tressed Public Housing: Early Results from HOPE VI Projects in Atlanta, Chicago, and San
Antonio, 10 Hous. POL'Y DEBATE 95 (1999).
181. See SUSAN J. POPKIN, URBAN INST., THE HOPE VI PROGRAM, WHAT
ABoTrr THE RESIDENTS? (2002). See also Georgette C. Poindexter, Who Gets the Final No?
Tenant Participation in Public Housing Redevelopment, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y.
659, 662-63 (2000).
182. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Homeownership Zones (HOZ), http://
www.disasterhousing.gov/offices/cpdlaffordablehousinglprograms/hoz/index.cfm.
183. JOE KIRCHNER ET. AL., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & U, ,AN DEV., INTERIM
EVALUATION OF HUD's HOMEOWNERSHIP ZONE INITIATIVE 12 (2007).
184. Id. These cities were Baltimore, Buffalo, Cleveland, Flint, Indianapolis, Lou-
isville, New York, Philadelphia, Sacramento, San Juan, and Trenton.
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which ranged in size from 121 units (New York) to 465 units (Cleve-
land).185 Participating cities utilized various capital structures, including
CDBG grants, Section 108 loans, and low-income tax credits (when
rental units were part of development).' 8 6 Affordability was addressed
through construction subsidies, down payment assistance, subsidized
mortgages and "soft second" mortgage. 8 7  Specifically, the goals
included:
* Provide for significant new single-family (1-to-4 unit) homeown-
ership opportunities (an application that includes at least 300
new single family homes will be presumed to meet this standard;
others may demonstrate how a smaller number of units will suf-
fice to create visible change and revitalize the neighborhood).
* Result in measurable, visible improvement in the neighborhood.
* Provide for a mix of income levels.
* Leverage significant public and private resources.
* Establish extensive partnerships with business, lending institu-
tions, real estate professionals, builders, educational institutions,
religious entities, and/or other private or nonprofit organizations.
* Provide opportunities for participation by community residents,
including opportunities for homeownership.
* Include the development of housing opportunities as part of a
comprehensive, coordinated approach to the overall revitalization
of the neighborhood.
" Show streamlined local processes to ensure rapid construction and
program implementation.
* Begin development within 60 days of grant approval.
* Establish clear benchmarks for measuring performance.
* Use innovative construction techniques and land use planning to
reduce the cost of housing construction and minimize regulatory
barriers.
* Take advantage of the most recent advances in urban housing
design to create a sense of neighborhood and community
throughout the overall plan for the area."8
Although significant issues were encountered (including but not
limited to delays in construction, difficulty in site acquisition, and reloca-
185. Id. at 14.
186. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., HOMEOWNERSHIP ZONES (HOZ),
http://www.disasterhousing.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/programs/hoz/index.cfm
(last visited June 21, 2010).
187. For example, a "soft second" mortgage of up to $25,000 was given to home-
owners in Louisville with the requirement that the homeowner remain in the house for
ten years, with a percentage of the loan forgiven each year. Telephone Interview with Tim
Barry, Director of Louisville Metro Housing Authority (Feb. 2010).
188. KIRCHNER ET. AL., supra note 183, at 5-6.
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tion of existing residents during the construction), most projects achieved
the stated goals. 8 9 In interviews with local Housing Authority officials,
there was unanimous agreement that they would participate in the pro-
gram again if offered the opportunity.' Foreclosures have been virtually
non-existent. Crime decreased. Neighborhoods were revitalized with
parks. 9 1 Neighborhoods that once had residents by default now had
residents by choice. In the words of one Housing official: "[y]ou must
give incentive to people who have choice to come back."'1 92
Perhaps the most exciting use of this program was when Louisville
tied HOZ development with HOPE VI development. Likewise, in Balti-
more a Hope VI project sits adjacent to the homeownership zone but was
developed separately. In their assessment of the project, HUD reviewers
stated in their interim evaluation in 2005 that "the HOZ approach has
resulted in significant, positive changes in most of the target areas. 
'193
The report praised "how the HOZ approach can be combined with
HOPE VI development to integrate public housing rental units with
middle-income homeownership housing in a totally rebuilt
neighborhood."1 94
According to HUD, HOZ was a demonstration project and no
additional funding was proposed. The Obama Administration has,
instead, enlarged the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP2) (own-
ership) and the Choice Neighborhood Initiative (rental), and incorpo-
rated some HOZ-type elements. 1 "9 In 2009, NSP2 was established
through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.1 96 On January
14, 2010, HUD awarded $1.93 billion in grants to fifty-six nationwide
grantees.' 97 NSP2 funds were also distributed to consortiums, not only
state and local governments. 9 8 NSP2 funds are intended to be used over
189. See Salama, supra note 180.
190. Telephone interviews with Henrietta Owusu, Dir., Div. of Hous. Prod., City
of Trenton (Feb. 2010); Clint Tearnan, Econ. Dev. Officer, Office Project Fin., City of
Baltimore (Feb. 2010); Robert Stitt, Mgmt. Analyst/Homeownership Zone Coordinator,
Sacramento Hous. & Redev. Agency, City of Sacramento (Feb. 2010).
191. Some of the developments (notably Baltimore and Sacramento) initially
hoped to attract commercial activity but have, as yet, been unable to clear this hurdle.
192. Telephone interview with Tim Barry, Dir., Louisville Metro Housing
Authority (Feb. 2010).
193. KIRCHNER ET. AL., supra note 183, at 13.
194. Id.
195. Interview with Ginger Macomber, HOZ Coordinator, HUD (Feb. 2010).
196. Pub. L. No. 111-5, tit. XII (Transportation and Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, and Related Agencies), 123 Stat. 203 (2009). See also U.S. Dep't Hous. &
Urban Dev., Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/
communitydevelopment/programs/neighborhoodspg/arrafactsheet.cfm.
197. Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2, supra note 196.
198. U.S. Dep't Hous. & Urban Dev., Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2,
FAQs on NSP2, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/
neighborhoodspg/nsp2_questanswers.pdf.
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a three-year period, with over 50% of the grant needing to be spent
within the first two years.' 9 9
While NSP2 targets vacant, abandoned and dilapidated housing
(i.e., it is a place-based strategy), it also incorporates people-based strate-
gies by including consortiums of local leaders in the development pro-
cess. Expansion of the demonstration program provides an exciting
opportunity to rethink our approach to urban homeownership. First, the
program addresses one of the major problems of current urban home-
ownership-the dilapidated state of available housing stock. One of the
big attractions of the push to suburban living was a new house, and this
program offers the same attraction to urban residents. Second, it
addresses the proper use of federal financial intervention. Indirect market
intervention (through Fannie and Freddie) proved disastrous, and regula-
tory intervention (through CRA) was spotty. HOZ program uses the
federal money as leverage. Different communities utilized a range of
funding sources but all relied on a mix of some sort.
The final, and perhaps most important, component of HOZ is that
it is easily bundled with other rental-based programs such as HOPE VI
and the Choice Neighborhood Initiative. The Choice Neighborhood Ini-
tiative was passed to "expand on the legacy of HOPE VI by expanding
the range of activities eligible for funding and capitalize on the full range
of stakeholders we know are needed and want to be involved-from local
governments and non-profits to private firms and public housing agen-
cies." 2"0 The Choice Neighborhood Initiative is essentially HOPE VI
funding with available funds being able to be used for early childhood
education programs and criteria that also take into account "green devel-
opment and energy efficiency strategies."201 HUD's proposed fiscal 2010
budget has funding for the Choice Neighborhood Initiative and HOPE
VI set at $250 million, compared to the $120 million used for HOPE VI
funding in fiscal 2009.202
Homeownership anchors neighborhoods and can, given the right
set of circumstances, permit owners to build capital. But homeownership
is not for everyone. At the same time, decent affordable neighborhoods
199. Id.
200. Shaun Donovan, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Prepared
Remarks at the Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program's Discussion: From
Despair to Hope: Two HUD Secretaries on Urban Revitalization and Opportunity (Jul.
14, 2009), available at http://www.hud.gov/news/speeches/2009-07-14.cfm.
201. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Announces $113
Million Available for Public Housing Transformation, Community Revitalization;
Obama Administration Stresses Early Childhood Education in 2009 Hope VI Program,
available at http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=PR09-119.cfm.
202. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Announces $113 Mil-
lion Available for Public Housing Transformation, Community Revitalization (July 14,
2009), available at http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/press/pres.releases_
mediaadvisories/2009/HUDNo.09-119.
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are the right of all citizens-not just those able to buy a home. A sound
approach to urban policy ties together both owner and rental programs.
Such a holistic approach would not only build city neighborhoods, but
also empower city residents. HOZ demonstrated that such an approach
can have profound positive effects in cities as disparate as Trenton and
Sacramento. Such opportunities should be replicated nationwide.

